Causation is Macroscopic but Not Papineau – – In Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Herbert Feigl was an Austrian-born logical empiricist philosopher who published the .. Or, as Feigl puts it in “The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’”. Herbert Feigl was a Regents’ professor of philosophy at the University of Minnesota and director of the Minnesota Center for the Philosophy of Science.
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Furthermore, it should be emphasized that Feigl, together with Paul Meehl, energetically promoted the revalorization of psychology as a serious academic discipline. According to the early, logical positivist, conceptions of language and science, the meaning of a proposition must be anchored in observable facts.
But this does not imply that all reality is, hpysical panpsychism would have it, intrinsically psychic. Thus, in the logical positivist account, analytic propositions had to be sharply distinguished from synthetic propositions. Want to Read saving…. Reprinted in Feigl and Sellarspp. In particular his focusing on the semantic notions of reference and truth physjcal out as instructive for the following development, as it is represented in the programmatically diverse writings of Richard Boyd, Larry Laudan, and specifically Hilary Putnam.
The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’: Find it on Scholar. On the whole, it can be said that identity theory was discussed from various philosophical perspectives.
In the same year, he gave a series of lectures at the Bauhaus in Dessau, between which and the Vienna Circle there were interesting parallels in both intellectual outlook and political approach see Galison Accordingly, reality should be ascribed to whatever is confirmed as having a place in the spatiotemporal-causal system. Thr this regard we were closer to the views of Zilsel and Popper.
To ask other readers questions about The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’please sign up. Now Professor Feigl takes account of the critical discussions and presents his own comments with respect to the most important points raised in the criticisms.
Together with Friedrich Waismann he had suggested to Schlick the formation of an evening discussion group see Feiglp.
Reprinted in Feiglpp. Preface to Postscript pp. Analysis of the Mind-Body Problem 5. This meant, physica, the first place, that the corroboration of the philosophically outlined monism had to be provided, not by philosophical analysis again, but by the factual sciences themselves.
As Feigl reported in an unpublished interview, [t]he approximate date of the beginning of the [Vienna Circle] wasbut I tge not remember whether it was in the spring or in the fall of that year. Moreover, Feigl and Blumberg maintained that even the concepts of the empirical sciences are such as can be subject to a purely formal, logical, reconstruction.
Herbert Feigl, The ‘mental’ and the ‘physical’ – PhilPapers
menal Consequently, we have two kinds of evidence for one kental the same type of events. Relying on a frequency interpretation of probability, he argued that the limiting value of an infinite sequence can only be inferred inductively, which in turn implied that probability is dependent on induction and not vice versa. Why ‘Non-Mental’ Won’t Work: Karen marked it as to-read Oct 13, Rather, they are themselves subject of scientific explanation.
Accordingly, it is mental states which are to be regarded as the referents of both psychological and physical terms.
The ‘mental’ and the ‘physical’
Related Entries Carnap, Rudolf empiricism: The influence of the cultural and moral traditions as well as psychology can provide a very plausible naturalistic explanation of religious experience. The Essay and a Postscript. Just as in his discussion of the realism issue, he leaves it to the factual sciences to judge about the adequacy of his preferred philosophical position.
But the very adoption of the confirmability criterion in preference to the narrower verifiability criterion allows as much realism as we are ever likely to warrant. I should think, the available evidence points with remarkable consistency in the direction of a system of psychology, psycho-physics and psychophysiology which provides for the monistic solution here outlined.
Oliver marked it as to-read May 18, It has nothing to do with experience, but only with the internal structure of language. He burst out at me: Sign in Create an account. By his own account, however, the testability or confirmability of an assertion is the crucial criterion for its being meaningful.
This article has no associated abstract. InFeigl became one of the co-founders of the Vienna Circle.
InFeigl began to study mathematics, physics, and philosophy at the University of Munich. Just a moment while we sign you in to your Goodreads account.
In this sense, the reality of atoms and other theoretically postulated entities is equally capable of empirical test as the reality of rocks and trees. But encouraged and buttressed by the support of Popper, Reichenbach, and Zilsel, I regained confidence in my earlier realism and developed it in my first book on Theorie und Erfahrung in der Physik […].
University of Minnesota Press. Inhe was granted US citizenship. Like in the case of the realism issue, Feigl attempts at a semantically more sophisticated revision of the original Schlickian point of view. Selected New References pp. The central core of the proposed solution rests upon the distinction between evidence and reference.